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DAMAGES FOR MENTAL SUFFERING CAUSED BY INSURERS:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TORT AND CONTRACT
I. Introduction
In the past, insurers have been virtually immune from liability for the
mental suffering caused by their more extreme settlement tactics.1 However,
several recent decisions have indicated a trend toward holding an insurer liable
for such mental injury. These decisions attest to the fact that the law of liability
for the infliction of mental suffering is still in a process of expansion.2 There
is a definite tendency today to give increased protection to the interest in one's
peace of mind.' This movement has developed chiefly in the law of tort. How-
ever, in the area of insurance contracts, the development has also involved some
change in the law of contract. This trend, together with the increased concern
for the consumer, serves as a warning to insurers that outrageous settlement prac-
tices will lead to harsh reprisals. This new vulnerability and the decisions which
have established it are the subject of this note.
II. Insurer's Liability for Mental Distress
A. Crisci: Foreseeability
Although the "general rule" is that in breach of contract actions damages
for mental suffering are not allowed,4 a distinction is made between two classes
of contracts. Most contracts are commercial in nature, having as their dominant
purpose the promotion of a pecuniary interest. In this type of contract the courts
will uniformly deny recovery for mental suffering caused by the loss of the bar-
gain.' However, when the primary interest infringed upon by the breach is not
pecuniary but rather personal in nature, other policies come into play and relief
1 Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental
anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental
reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger,
chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea.
RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment j at 77 (1965); see Prosser, Insult and
Outrage, 44 CAL. L. Rnv. 40, 43 (1956).
2 11 W. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1341, at 219-20 (3d ed. 1968). American Jurispru-
dence comments that: "Some leai-ned text writers are of the opinion that legal protection to the
interest in mental and emotional tranquility is in an intermediate state of development." 52 Am.
JUR. Torts § 46, at 391 (1944). See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12,
at 50, 52 (4th ed. 1971), references collected id. n. 27, n. 50; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46, comment c at 72 (1965); id. Reporter's Note at 48; 1 HARPER & JAmES, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 9.1, at 667-68 (1956); Annot., 64 A.L.R. 2d 100, 119-20 (1959); Prosser,
Insult and Outrage, upra note 1 at 40, and references collected id. n.1.
3 See Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723, 728-29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 947 (1955).
4 E.g., Robinson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 452, 68 S.W. 656 (1902),
Aaron v. Ward, 203 N.Y. 351, 354, 96 N.E. 736 '(1911). C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF DAMAGES § 145, at 592 (1935). See 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1076, at 426 (1964);
11 W. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1341, at 214 (3d ed. 1968).
5 E.g., Wachtel v. Nat'l Alfalfa Journal Co., 190 Iowa 1293, 176 N.W. 801 (1920). A
contestant in a magazine contest could not recover for mental suffering when the contest was
discontinued. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4 at 592-93. See 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1076,
at 426 (1964); 11 W. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS at 214 (3d ed. 1968).
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for mental suffering is allowed.' The most common types of contract in the
latter category have been contracts to marry, contracts of carriers and innkeepers
with passengers and guests, contracts for the disposition of dead bodies, and con-
tracts for the delivery of death messages." The element common to all of these
cases and other "personal" actions is that they are all cases in which "personal
feelings are most deeply involved and in which mental suffering is likely to be
most poignant."'
Historically, the courts have viewed an insurance contract as being "com-
mercial" rather than "personal" in nature and thus damages for mental suffer-
ing have been disallowed.' It is generally felt that by contracting for insurance
one is seeking to gain only pecuniary benefits and any mental suffering resulting
from breach is considered not "reasonably foreseeable."
In 1967, however, insurance contracts were for the first time considered
"personal" in nature, Crisci v. Security Insurance Co." was the first case which
allowed recovery against an insurer for mental suffering as an incident of
damages." Mrs. Crisci had a liability insurance policy of $10,000 covering her
apartment building. One of her tenants was injured on a stairway and filed a
personal injury suit against her for $400,000. The defendant insurance company
had an opportunity to settle for $9,000, but failed to do so, even though it was
aware that the tenant was likely to recover a verdict of at least $100,000. The
suit went to trial, and the tenant was awarded $101,000 judgment against Mrs.
Crisci. Mrs. Crisci, faced with a judgment of $91,000 in excess of her coverage,
became extremely indigent. The change in her financial condition resulted in a
decline in her physical health which led to hysteria and several suicide attempts.
She brought suit against the insurance company for wrongfully refusing to settle
within policy limits.
The court allowed recovery for mental suffering as an "aggravation of
damages."' 2 It held "that a plaintiff who as a result of a defendant's tortious
conduct loses his property and suffers mental distress may recover not only for
the pecuniary loss but also for his mental distress."' 3 While the foreseeability
limitation would preclude recovery for mental suffering in a "commercial" con-
tract, the court found liability insurance contracts to be "personal" in nature,
6 RESTATEMENT OP CONTRACTS § 341 (1932):
In actions for breach of contract, damages will not be given as compensation
for mental suffering, except where the breach was .. . of a contract to render a per-
formance of such a character that the defendant had reason to know when the contract
was made that the breach would cause mental suffering for reasons other than mere
pecuniary loss.
7 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1076, at 429 (1964).
8 Id.
9 The traditional measure of contract damages limits recovery, in the normal situation,
to policy benefits plus interest. New Orleans Ins. Ass'n v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 378
(1872). Where consequential damages are sought the limitations of Hadley v. Baxendale con-
trol. Comment, Damages Assessed Against Insurer for Wrongful Failure to Pay. 10 Wm. &
MARY L. REv. 466, 467 (1968).
10 66 Cal.2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
11 Comment, An Insurance Company's Duty to Settle: Qtaalified or Absolute?) 41 So.
CALF. L. REV. 120 (1968).
12 66 Cal,2d at 433-34, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19,
13 Id.
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and thus damages for mental suffering were foreseeable. The court explained
that liability insurance contracts are "personal" in that:
... plaintiff did not seek by the contract involved here to obtain a com-
mercial advantage but to protect herself against the risks of accidental
losses, including the mental distress which might follow from the losses.
Among the considerations in purchasing liability insurance, as insurers are
well aware, is the peace of mind and security it will provide in the event of
an accidental loss, . .. recovery of damages for mental suffering has been
permitted for breach of contracts which directly concern the comfort, hap-
piness or personal esteem of one of the parties.' 4
Thus the court in Crisci found an insurer's breach of contract to be a sufi-
cient basis upon which to allow damages for mental suffering. Further, the court
firmly placed liability insurance contracts within the category of contracts which
have been held to "directly concern the comfort, happiness or personal esteem
of one of the parties"' (i.e., "personal" contracts).
B. Fletcher: Outrageous Conduct
Historically, the intentional infliction of mental distress was not itself deemed
to be a sufficient basis for an action in tort.' All remedy for mental injury was
refused unless it could be brought within the context of some already recognized
tort. A plaintiff would have to find some independent tort to serve as a peg upon
which to hang his mental damage.' The independent cause of action can be
other than a tort claim. In certain cases, as previously discussed,' a breach of
contract can create a right to recover for mental suffering. However, the Hadley
rule strictly limits the possibility of such "parasitic" damages. It was only with
Crisci that insurance contracts were added to those contracts for which damage
for mental suffering is deemed foreseeable.
It was only in the 1930's that the intentioned infliction of mental distress,
at least by extreme and outrageous conduct, began to be recognized as a cause
of action in itself. 9 Since that time the tort has been more fully developed and
its application has been expanded to protect one's peace of mind in many areas."
Today it appears to be quite generally recognized as a separate tort."'
Inherent in the elements of this tort are limitations as to when the "new
tort" is applicable2 2 The first limitation which has emerged from the cases is
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 W. PRossrR, HANDBOOx or THnE LAW op ToRTs § 12, at 51-52 (4th ed. 1971); Prosser,
Insult and Outrage, 44 CA.. L. REv. 40, 42-43 (1956).
17 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs supra note 16 at 52.
18 See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
19 W. PROssER, supra note 16 at 56; Prosser, supra note 16 at 43.
20 W. PROSSER, 3upra note 16 § 12.
21 Id. at 52; Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra note 16 at 40-44. RBsTATEENm r (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46 (1965) states:
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress,
and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
22 The elements as set out in Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App.3d 376,
395, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 88 (1970) are:
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that the defendant's conduct must be extreme and outrageous.23 While a defen-
dant's acts in themselves may not be extreme and outrageous,2 there are other
factors to be considered. Both the Restatement and Prosser point to two factors,
either of which, if present, makes a defendant's acts more susceptible to a finding
of outrageousness. The first factor is set forth in the Restatement as follows:
The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an
abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives
him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his
interests. 5
It is because of their position of power that the more extreme methods of collec-
tion agencies and other creditors have been found to be outrageous." Such
misuse of one's position of power involves behavior which resembles extortion.
There have been indications that bullying tactics of insurance adjusters trying
to force a settlement may come under the "new tort."27
The second factor which makes a defendant's behavior particularly sus-
ceptible to a finding of outrageousness is described in the Restatement as follows:
The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from the
actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to the emotional
distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. The
conduct may become heartless, flagrant and outrageous when the actor
proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did
not know.
2 s
The essential element of the outrage is the defendant's awareness of the victim's
vulnerability. 9 There have been a number of decisions in which sick people
and children have recovered for conduct which, except for the fact that the
defendant was aware of plaintiff's condition, would not in itself be labelled
(1) Outrageous conduct by the defendant;
(2) The defendant's intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of
emotional distress;
(3) The plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and
(4) Actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's
outrageous conduct.
See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
23 W. PROSSER, supra note 16 at 56; Prosser, supra note 16 at 43-44.
24 In Wilkinson v. Downtown, [1897] 2 Q.B.D. 57, defendant spread rumors that the
plaintiff's son had hanged himself. In State Rubbish Collectors Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d
330, 240 P. 2d 282 (1952) an association of rubbish collectors threatened to beat the
plaintiff up, destroy his truck and put him out of business, unless he paid over proceeds from a
territory which they had allocated to one of their members.
25 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) Or TORTS § 46, comment e (1965). See W. PRossR supra
note 16 at 56-58; Prosser, supra note 16 at 48-50.
26 Such methods include:
... violent cursing, abuse, and accusations of dishonesty, through a series of letters
. . . which repeatediy threaten arrest, ruination of credit, or a suit which is never
brought, or telephone calls around the clock, or attempts to pile up the pressure by
involving the plaintiff's employer, his relatives, his neighbors or the public in the
controversy ....
W. PROSSER, supra note 16 at 57; Prosser, supra note 16 at 48.
27 Prosser, supra note 16 at 49. See cases id. at n.50.
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment f at 75 (1965). See W. PROSSER,
supra note 16 at 58; Prosser, supra note 16 at 50-51.
29 Prosser, supra note 16 at 50.
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extreme or outrageous. 0 An illustrative case ls Clark v. Associated Retail Credit
Men of Washington, D.C." In that case defendant used comparatively mild,
and arguably justified, threats in its efforts to collect a debt. However, the
defendant was aware of the fact that plaintiff was suffering from arterial hyper-
tension which threatened his eyesight. Nevertheless, defendant continued with
the collection attempts. The defendant's awareness of the debtor's health was
the factor which converted what was but a moderately aggressive attempt at
collection into outrageous conduct.
While the requirement of extreme and outrageous conduct limits the types
of cases to which the "new tort" can apply, there have been some indications
that liability might be found because of an insurer's high-pressure settlement
methods. Two comparatively recent cases have taken some initiative in estab-
lishing an insurer's liability for the intentional infliction of mental distress.
In 1970 Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.32 became the first
case to make use of the "new tort" in an insurance context." In this case the
plaintiff was the victim of an industrial accident which resulted in an injury
to his back. He was eventually placed on disability and fired from his job. The
plaintiff was examined by many doctors. There was virtually unanimous agree-
ment that the disability was caused by the industrial accident. Despite all the
medical reports to the contrary, the insurer's claims manager concluded that the
claim was one for sickness alone and not for injury."
Later, based upon one doctor's opinion that the plaintiff's disability was
partially caused by a preexisting congenital defect, the defendant wrote the
plaintiff that an "intensive investigation" had revealed that the plaintiff had
made a misrepresentation in acquiring the policy and that the benefits already
received would have to be returned. In subsequent communications, the defen-
dant suggested a settlement of the alleged dispute which would allow the plain-
tiff to retain the benefits already received, but would release the insurer from all
liability. The defendant's actions caused plaintiff worry and concern over the
implied threats of a lawsuit, and the many misfortunes that might befall himself
and his family because of the withholding of benefit payments.
The California Court of Appeals held that the defendant, without probable
cause for believing that the plaintiff's disability was due to anything other than
his work injury, engaged in concerted conduct to induce the plaintiff to surrender
his policy by means of false and threatening letters and that the insurer, with
malice and in bad faith, refused to pay the plaintiff's legitimate claim."5 The
court's finding of outrageous conduct was not based on the defendant's acts
alone. Other factors were considered, one of which was the insurance company's
30 W. PROSSER, supra note 16 at 58. See id. nn.5, 6 & 7 for cases; Prosser, supra note 16 at
50-51.
31 70 U.S. App. D.C. 183, 105 F.2d 62 (1939).
32 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
33 Comment, 47 WASH. L. Rnv. 489, 492 (1972); Comment, 7 CALIF. W. L. Rlv. 496,
502 (1971).
34 The policy provided for payment of $150.00 per month for a maximum of two years in
the event of sickness, and for a maximum period of thirty years in the event of an accident. The
insurer's liability would be greatly reduced by a finding of sickness rather than accident.
35 Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 393, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 87(1970).
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position of power, The insurer misused its position in a manner more subtle
than the traditional methods used by creditors."
A second factor which the court considered was the defendant's knowledge
of plaintiff's unusual susceptibilities. As in Clark,"7 the defendants in Fletcher
were aware that plaintiff suffered from a serious injury. Yet in Fletcher it was
not so much the back injury which rendered plaintiff susceptible to mental dis-
tress as it was the resultant inability to provide for his family. It was known
that he was never expected to return to work, and that he was providing for his
large family on an income of only $384.00 a month.3 8 Thus the insurance com-
pany knew or should have known that this man could be unusually susceptible ta
emotional distress by threats of nonpayment. With that susceptibility in mind,
the defendants wrongfully attempted to reduce plaintiff's already meager income,
an act which could be seen as likely to cause severe mental suffering.
By its very nature, an insurer-insured relationship frequently contains the
above-mentioned two factors, and thus is highly vulnerable to the "new tort"
because of the ease with which conduct will be found outrageous. Even so it is
felt that the Fletcher court was most influenced by yet a third factor.3 The
insurer in Fletcher held more than a position of power with respect to its policy-
holder-arising from its contractual relationship with the insured was a legal
duty to protect the insured's interests.4" The court, in recognizing that fact,
stated:
An insurer owes to its insured an implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair
dealing that it will do nothing to deprive the insured of the benefits of the
policy.... Included within this duty in the case of a liability insurance
policy is the duty to act reasonably and in good faith to settle claims against
the insured by a third person .... We think that, similarly, the implied-in-
law duty of good faith and fair dealing imposes upon a disability insurer a
duty not to threaten to withhold or actually withhold payments, maliciously
and without probable cause, for the purpose of injuring its insured by de-
priving him of the benefits of the policy."
The court explained that this special relationship and duties arising from it
exist partly because of the great disparity in the economic situation and bar-
gaining abilities of the insurer and insured and partly because of the fact that
an insured is contracting not to obtain a commercial advantage but rather "to
protect [himself] against the risks of accidental losses, including the mental dis-
tress which might follow from the losses." 2
It has been argued that this third factor, the implied duties of any insurer
arising from the insurance relationship, played a dominant role in the court's
36 See note 26 supra.
37 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
38 10 Cal. App. 3d at 389, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
39 Keenan, The Insurer and the Tort of the Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress,
1972 INs. CouN. J. 335.
40 "This third factor when present may in some cases be thought of as an extension of the
position of power consideration, though both the earlier authorities and the Fletcher court fail
to discuss it as such; or it may be considered a separate element," Id. at 339.
41 10 Cal. App. 3d at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
42 Id. at 405, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
1308 Uune, 19731
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finding defendant's conduct to be outrageous." This argument is based upon
the fact that the real essence of defendant's wrong was the bad faith failure to
perform its special duties of good faith and fair dealing. That is, the basis for
their cancellation of benefits, and thus the basis for plaintiffs action, was defen-
dant's bad faith interpretation of the plaintiff's medical reports. It was clear
that the defendant intended to avoid its legal obligation. It hoped to create a
dispute with full knowledge that the plaintiff would be hard pressed financially
to contest or repay the benefits already received, and would probably be forced
to settle on the insurance company's terms. In some areas of business, such prac-
tices as the defendant's are considered legally permissible though perhaps highly
unethical. Yet, due to the special relationship and related duties which the court
found to exist within an insurance agreement, it held the insurer's conduct to be
impermissible.
While the court did not directly analyze the relationship between a disability
insurer and the insured, its reliance on Crisci" indicates that it considered the
relationship to be essentially the same as that present in the case of liability in-
surance and that similar duties arise from the relationship. Under the excessive
liability doctrine which was followed in Crisci, a liability insurance contract, in
addition to establishing an ordinary contractual relationship between the parties,
creates a fiduciary relationship under which the insurer as fiduciary owes special
duties to his insured. In acting in this fiduciary capacity a liability insurer is
to act with the care of an expert in the defense of a personal injury suit.45 The
Fletcher court implied that the nature of the two insurance relationships is
essentially the same, and that the disability insurer should be subjected to similar
standards of care. The court noted that in all insurance situations the insured
is basically contracting for financial and emotional security in the event of loss;
this is especially true in disability insurance since the "very risks insured against
presuppose that if and when a claim is made, the insured will be disabled and
in strait financial circumstances.... ."" It was with this consideration in mind
that the court concluded that the disability insurer was acting as his insured's
agent and was thus subject to the duties arising from that position. The accept-
ance of this responsibility places an insurer in a highly professional position,
comparable to that of a physician or attorney. It not only requires expertise,
but also makes the insurer highly responsible for its policyholder's well-being."
In light of this view of the insurer-insured relationship, it is understandable why
the court found the defendant's actions to be outrageous.
Fletcher is unique in holding that an insurance company's threatened and
actual bad faith refusals to make payments under its policy are essentially tor-
tious in nature and are in themselves acts upon which there is sufficient basis
(extreme and outrageous conduct) for an action against the insurer for inten-
43 Keenan, supra note 39 at 339.
44 Crisci v. Security Pacific Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P. 2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967).
45 Appleman & Zinmerly, Excess Liability of Insurer for Failure to Settle within Policy
Limits, 3 THE PLAINTIFF'S ADVOCATE & THE TRrAL LAWYERS QUARTERLY 204, 205 '(1967).
46 Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 405, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95
(1970).
47 Keenan, supra note 39 at 340.
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tional infliction of emotional distress. 8 As we have already seen this decision
rested upon a finding that the company employed refusals in conjunction with
false and threatening communications directed to the disabled insured in an
attempt to force him into surrendering his policy or disadvantageously settling a
nonexistent dispute.4 9 The court recognizing that a breach of contract was also
present referred to the settled rule that punitive damages may not be recovered
for breach of contract.5 0 However, the court went on to say that if the conduct
is tortious, damages for emotional distress including punitive damages are re-
coverable despite the fact that the conduct constituting the tort is also a breach
of contract.5
The decision that an action in tort for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress will lie for such behavior by an insurer is obviously a significant step out-
side the restrictions of prior law. It is also very reasonable to expect that, due to
the inadequacies of prior law 2 in redressing grievances in this area, the Fletcher
holding will be accepted elsewhere, and expanded from the insurance contract
field to other breach of contract situations with similar conditions.
C. Eckenrode: Implied Contract Duty
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in handing
down the decision of Eckenrode u. Life of America Insurance Co.,5  became the
first court to follow California's lead in applying the "new tort" to an insurer's
dealings with its policyholders.5 4 In that case, the insured was the accidental
victim of a homicide. Under the policy agreement, the insurer was to pay plaintiff
(decedent's wife) $5,000 immediately upon proof of death from "accidental
causes." While plaintiff met all conditions of the policy and repeatedly demanded
payment, defendant insurer refused to pay. The decedent left plaintiff with
several children and no means of support. Denied payment by the insurer, she
was forced to rely on charity for bare necessities.
Being fully aware of the accidental nature of decedent's death, the insurer
breached the policy promise to pay immediately upon proof of death. In ad-
dition, the insurer, knowing plaintiff was in dire need of the policy proceeds, ap-
plied "economic coercion" in refusing to make payment on the policy and in
"inviting" plaintiff to "compromise" her claim by implying that it (insurer) had
a valid defense to the claim.55 As a proximate result of defendant's conduct
48 In Crisci, mental suffering, although an incident of damages, was not an independent
cause of action in itself.
49 Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93
(1970).
50 Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
51 Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
52 See note 66 infra.
53 Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., No. 71-1103 (7th Cir., Aug. 3, 1972).
54 In Chaney v. Fields Chevrolet Co., 484 P. 2d 824 (Ore. 1971), plaintiff failed to raise
the "new tort" at the trial court level. Additionally, defendant's conduct was not considered to
be outrageous. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 27 Cal. App. 3d 423, 103 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1972),
involved an action for damages resulting from alleged bad faith and outrageous conduct in
denying payment on three fire policies. The court held that defendant's conduct was not con-
sidered to be outrageous.
55 Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., No. 71-1103 (7th Cir., Aug. 3, 1972). The
court made reference to a letter sent by the insurance company suggesting that since the police
1310 [June, 1973]
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plaintiff suffered severe mental distress. The court held that plaintiff could, on
these facts, recover damages for her mental suffering caused by the insurer's
conduct. The court found defendant's conduct to be extreme and outrageous
and held that she could recover damages for the tort of intentional infliction of
mental distress.
The court made it clear that the insurer's behavior was characterized as
"outrageous" after a consideration of its (1) position of power, and (2) its
knowledge of plaintiff's peculiar susceptibility to pressure of this type. It is
significant that this court did not even mention the factor which dominated the
Fletcher court's finding of outrageousness, that is, the implied-in-law duty of good
faith and fair dealing arising from the fiduciary nature of the insurer-insured re-
lationship.
There is a valid question as to why the court in Eckenrode did not even
mention the third factor which the Fletcher court found to be quite important.
It is suggested that the answer to that question is found within one of the court's
supporting considerations. The court in finding the insurer's behavior out-
rageous stated that it was also taking into consideration the fact that "insurance
contracts are subject to the same implied conditions of good faith and fair deal-
ing as are other contracts. . . 2 6 That is, in this court's view an insurance
contract creates only a contractual relationship and not a fiduciary relationship."
By rejecting the idea of a fiduciary relationship, the court also rejects any implied-
in-law duties arising from such a relationship.
The Eckenrode court, while rejecting those duties, brought others into play.
Specifically, the court indicated that the duties of good faith and fair dealing
which arise from the normal contractual relationship could serve as the basis for
a cause of action in contract."s Foreseeability of emotional distress was not seen
as problematic since the court felt that by the very nature of the risks insured
against, an insurer is put on notice that a beneficiary would be susceptible to
emotional distress from an insurer's use of high-pressure tactics. 9
Thus, in addition to finding a cause of action in tort, the Eckenrode court
has made a rather clear statement that an action also will lie in contract for a
breach of the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing and that in an in-
surance contract context mental distress is a foreseeable result of a breach of
those implied duties. This, of course, is a significant finding. Although a plaintiff
may avoid the foreseeability problem by suing in tort, he now may have the
option of suing in contract for emotional distress, which the Eckenrode court feels
is a foreseeable damage. However, this is only dicta and there has not yet been
a decision on that basis.
investigation would probably not be completed until the "very distant future," she might con-
sider offering to "settle" rather than waiting for the police report to be completed.
56 Id. at 7.
57 Id.
58 That these duties are seen as the basis for an action in contract for mental distress is
made clear in a footnote to the opinion: "We think it is clear that an action of the type in-
volved here sounds both in contract and in tort." Id. n.4 .
59 Id. at 7.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
III. Conclusion
While an insurer's bad faith refusal to pay benefits is a breach of contract,
the damages traditionally permitted under contract law have proven inadequate
where, as a result of the insurer's refusal, its policyholder suffers severe emotional
distress. This inadequacy in relief is due to the decision that such mental suffer-
ing is not reasonably foreseeable by an insurer at the time he made the contract."
The requirement that contract damages be foreseeable resulted from a reali-
zation that allowing full compensation could impose a crushing burden on a
breaching party.61 It has further been observed that the common law has placed
significant limitations on the extent to which a promisee can recover damages for
disappointed expectations. 2 These same considerations explain the limitation
which generally denies recovery for mental suffering in contract actions, the risk
of which must normally be borne by the promisee."
While contract law has been stubborn in continuing to strictly limit recover-
able damages so as to promote a favorable business climate, tort law has come to
recognize that the insured's interests need protection also. The tort of intentional
infliction of mental distress has been a key weapon in protecting the individual
against the more tortious acts of bill collectors and others. 4 With Fletcher, and
more recently Eckenrode, it is clear that such protection will be available to an
aggrieved person in the insurance field. The "new tort" remedies many of the
failings of an action in contract. The greater flexibility of a tort measure of
damages serves both to better compensate the insured and to deter insurers from
denying future claims. Contract damages have been inadequate in both these
respects. A plaintiff with limited financial and legal resources would often be
precluded from bringing suit where the hope is for only a limited recovery. In
allowing recovery for all proximately caused injury, an action in tort provides a
plaintiff with a suit which is worth bringing, and one which will allow redress
of all his injuries.
The tort action also tends to deter future bad faith nonpayment by insurers
through the awarding of larger compensatory and punitive damages. Without
these larger assessments an insurer has little to lose by denying the claims of
persons who he feels can be overcome by pressure.65 This fact is attested to by
the claims manager in Fletcher who admitted that he would not hesitate to use
the same tactics again in a similar situation.6 6 The larger award in tort would
discourage such practices.
While a tort measure of damages makes for a fuller recovery and deters
insurers from such practices, we must still be concerned with the threat of run-
away punitive damages. Contract law has expressed a legitimate concern over
60 See note 9 supra.
61 Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUm. L. Rv. 1145 '(1970).
62 Id. at 1207-08.
63 Id. at 1208.
64 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 57 (4th ed. 1971).
65 If the insured were to later bring an action for breach of contract, he would normally
only be able to recover the policy benefits which he was already entitled to receive. See note
9 supra.
66 Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 408-09, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78,
99 (1970).
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the possible effect of large recoveries from businesses. The threat of this happen-
ing through large punitive assessments must be recognized. As pointed out, how-
ever, punitive damages are quite helpful in preventing such behavior by insurers
in the first instance.
Obviously, a balancing of the conflicting interests of the insurer and insured
is required. This balancing has been effectively achieved by some states through
statutes which allow for, but limit the amount of punitive damages recoverable
for late or unjustified nonpayment of a policy's benefits6 A properly drawn
statute can protect both the insurance companies and the insured public. While
insurers have in the past opposed such penalty statutes their opposition has
probably been, in large part, due to the favored position they have held under
the common law. In light of the recent developments in the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress their attitude towards limiting statutes may be
changing.
While mental suffering resulting from an insurer's refusal to pay has tra-
ditionally been treated as unforeseeable contract damages the error and injustice
of a finding of unforeseeability are only now being recognized. The possibility of
a contract cause of action for mental distress in the insurance field is significant.
Although its importance is diminished with the applicability of the "new tort"
to this area, it nevertheless will serve as a good alternative to a suit in tort where
outrageousness or another requirement of a tort action is not met.
These developments have added a whole new dimension to the field of in-
surance contracts. From a position of virtual immunity to one of intense scrutiny,
the insurer now has added reasons to deal fairly with its policyholders. While an
insurer should not be subjected to crushing penalties for its misbehavior, it is time
that it be held responsible for the duties it has accepted. It is also time that
the often helpless policyholder is given a meaningful remedy against such un-
scrupulous activities.
John G. Holinka
67 E.g., TEx. CIv. STAT. INS. CoDE § 3.62 (Vernon's 1963) which provides that the insurer
shall pay twelve per cent damages in addition to the loss, and attorney's fees, for a failure to
pay within thirty days after demand is made under the policy.
NOTES
